The relationship between democracy and religion, and the question of how religion has contributed to democratisation have elicited a significant literature over recent years, with a general consensus emerging that whilst religious actors may play a role in such processes their role is not determinative of outcomes. Equally, there is no convincing suggestion that some traditions are inherently less democratic than others, though in some historical contexts religious attitudes towards democracy have veered in different directions -witness the Roman Catholic shift, from a broadly anti-democratic orientation in the century and a half after the French Revolution, to a position of critical support for democracy since 1945. In this article we focus on a particular religious tradition, Eastern Orthodoxy, in the Russian Federation after 1991. The Russian Orthodox Church made a negligible contribution to the downfall of the Soviet regime and entered the post-communist era with no experience of living under democratic conditions. More recently it has come to be seen as a key ally of President Putin, and has acted in ways that may have reinforced the perception of those who see Orthodoxy as somehow antithetical to democracy.
Following the collapse of communism, Russia embarked upon a transition whose end point was widely assumed to be liberal-democratic, but which in reality evolved towards something else. Some scholars focus on core elements of democracy which, for Mikael Wiggel, must include both electoral (popular government) and constitutional (limited government) elements, and he outlines a series of minimal conditions that a government must meet to be considered a political democracy. Though his focus is largely on Latin America, it could be said that Russia meets virtually none of the conditions he suggests, and therefore cannot be characterised as a political democracy, let alone a liberal democracy (Wigell 2008: 230-50) . Other commentators would refer to the present political arrangements as 'hybrid' in nature, with elements of both democracy and authoritarianism, or they might stress regimes as sitting on a spectrum with Russia shifting in a more overtly authoritarian direction since the elections of 2011-12 (Hale 20110: 33-41; Petrov, Lipman & Hale 2014: 1-26) . Those in the Kremlin would reject the criticisms and argue that what has been created is a democracy that accords with Russian traditional values, a 'sovereign democracy', 1 though this is rarely given much substantive content and is often characterised by what it is not -a slavish imitation of Western democracy. This evolving module, which in some shape or other is to be found in a range of countries from China to Iran, the rulers claim that their authority comes from the sovereign people yet, as John Keane suggests, the people are both 'ubiquitous and absent' (Ahmad, 2015: 85) . In this sense, what is being created is a radically minimalist version of Schumpeterian democracy, where 'the people', under some constraint, are permitted to elect to senior positions those chosen for them, but after elections are expected to be silent or serve as a supportive chorus whilst the (self)-chosen governed get on with the job.
Religion's role in this political evolution is less clear. The Russian Orthodox Church operates in a society that has been affected by the often brutal forced secularisation promoted within the Soviet Union. It functions in a society where rates of religious participation are close to those in Northern Europe yet where two thirds of the population identify themselves as Orthodox. Constitutionally Russia remains a secular state, in the sense that the 1993 constitution mandates the separation of church and state, yet the relationship of the two is closer than this formal status might suggest. Politically, it is not secular in the sense that over recent years the dominant Russian Orthodox Church has become part of the socially conservative coalition of support built by President Putin. 2 In this sense its role is perhaps best described as that of a dominant church, 3 where the majority formally self-identify as Orthodox, its symbols and historical ties clearly identity it with the history of the Russian state, and it enjoys various forms of recognition on the part of state authorities. It claims not to want establishment, though it probably enjoys greater political influence than the established Church of England. It does not, however, conform to the notion of a 'hegemonic religion' as defined by Jocelyne Cesari, because the state does not grant it 'exclusive legal, economic, or political rights denied to other religions' (Cesari 2014: 9) . Arguably it aspires to be a hegemonic religion, whilst, as we shall see, accepting a status as more than primus inter pares. Central to this is its understanding of a true secular state as not excluding religion from the public sphere and, more than that, of church and state acting in partnership for the good of the nation. President Putin was initially wary of this understanding, and during the debates over introducing religious education in schools during [2005] [2006] [2007] [2008] stressed that church and state were separate in Russia (Anderson 2015: 169) . More recently, however, he has tended to stress -echoing Samuel Huntington -that Orthodoxy is a core element of Russia's civilizational identity. This political shift is built in part on expediency, but also on an assumption that Russia has something different to offer, a revised version of a secular state that challenges what Hurd calls the dominant separationist-laicite models (Hurd 2008) or the previous anti-religious separation of the USSR. Here the sociological dominance of one tradition is given a recognised status and the ecclesiastical hierarchy some limited degree of influence within the ruling structure.
The Russian Orthodox Church and political transition (1985-2000)
Religious contributions to undermining authoritarian regimes and promoting transition to a democratic order have been well-documented. Most studies of religion and regime change in Southern Europe, Latin America, Africa or Asia focus on the ways in which religious actors offer a public critique of social injustice and human rights abuses, or provide symbolic outlets for resistance such as pilgrimages, holy places and funerals. They stress religious involvement in the institutional defence of civil society and provision of parallel outlets for debate and discussion, or their role in negotiating between government and opposition. In the case of certain Soviet bloc countries these patterns were evident, most notably in Poland, East
Germany and to some extent in Czechoslovakia. In the USSR, however, the religious contribution was negligible, with the partial exception of predominantly Catholic Lithuania.
In the Russian heartland Orthodox hierarchs were silent, offering no public critique of the existing system, nor playing a serious role in the defence of civil society. There were a handful of religious dissidents, some involved with political activity and attempts to defend the promises on human rights made by the Soviet constitution, but they were small in number and many were in prison at the time Gorbachev came to power. Once he started releasing prisoners of conscience at the end of 1986 they were able to play a role in the evolving civil society movements, but it would be hard to say that there was a distinctive institutional religious contribution. So, a simple answer here is to say that there was no significant religious role in the Soviet Union, despite the grand claims sometimes made for the contribution of religion to the wider collapse of communism, with special focus on the role of Pope John Paul II (Weigel 1992) .
Having said that, it may be that there was a less obvious contribution to regime change at the grassroots level rooted in the fact that religion survived at all after seventy years of forced secularisation. understand quite what it entailed. For the president and those around him, the first tasks were preventing a communist return whilst saving a collapsing economy, and over the coming years it was to become apparent that they were not too fussy about the means used. If asked to defend these means, they would suggest that without ensuring these two goals it would be impossible to build a functioning democracy.
For religious leaders, the overthrow of the old regime inevitably posed new challenges.
Even had they played a role in transition, this was likely to decline with the years as new social actors emerged -political parties, pressure groups, social movements etc. They may not have liked the old regime, but they sometimes missed the sense of order and the morally conservative nature of authoritarianism and were wary of what appeared to them to be the 'anything goes' mentality associated with democracy and pluralism. For the leaders of the Russian Orthodox Church democracy was certainly not a key priority, though they too bought into the discourse, and pledged their support. In practice, however, their immediate priorities were rebuilding churches and institutional structures mostly closed down in previous decades, finding sufficient personnel to meet the religious needs of the population, and educating a flock that mostly had only the vaguest idea of the Church's religious doctrine, moral teaching, and worship (Anderson 1994: 137-214; Ellis 1996 (Koesel 2014: 167) , nor could it be described as 'hegemonic' as defined by Cesari, because it did not enjoy exclusive privileging. Rather, those religious communities that were defined as 'traditional' to Russia (ie. largely tied to specific ethnic groups in the Scientologists who were dismissed as 'sects' with no genuine claims to a place in the new Russian religious landscape (Fagan 2012) .
developments during the 1990s and beyond, most notably in the attempts to restrict religious pluralism, critique the liberal-democratic nexus, push for a particular version of religious education in schools and claim the right to exercise moral guardianship over the wider society. Church leaders had no experience and little understanding of the demands of a democratic polity and were deeply suspicious of their implications for its own interests. In part this stemmed from their socialisation in the Soviet system, which left them like other organisations, defensive and suspicious of autonomous social action -though perhaps more so than some because of their internally hierarchical organisation and the need to cling to a conservative and traditionalist theology to survive Soviet era persecutions. Russian church leaders had no experience of functioning in a democratic order and now often felt more comfortable with the political leaders they had worked with prior to 1991. As deeply conservative men they were suspicious of the social pluralism that looked like license, and sought state support in constraining the worst excesses in both the religious and the social sphere. When it comes to assessing their contribution to democratisation one can focus on whether they prove willing to accept a degree of social and political pluralism, whether they encouraged tolerance and acceptance of difference, and how they operated in the spheres of civil and political society. At the leadership level the church has preferred to influence politics primarily by working within the corridors of power, where it has questioned the relevance of liberal democracy for Russia, seemingly rejected any notion of universal human rights, and taken a leading role in seeking to limit the rights of religious minorities and, more recently, in promoting other illiberal measures. Clearly the church was operating after 2000 in a political context where democracy in any meaningful sense was not on the political agenda, but this was reinforced by its decision taken to opt for a Kremlin supportive role rather than a 'prophetic' or pro-democratic orientation.
We shall return to some of these issues later, but here we focus on the question of religious pluralism. During the 1990s Orthodox hierarchs, in their first major flexing of political muscle, supported a campaign to change the relatively liberal Gorbachev era law on freedom of conscience in a way that restricted entry into the religious market-place. This culminated in a new law approved by the State Duma in 1997, the preamble to which offered a symbolic advantage to the Russian Orthodox Church whilst creating three distinct categories of religious organisations in respect of rights and recognition. Though not using the concept, it provided the basis for the later use of the concept of 'traditional religions' much utilised by the Orthodox Church and state officials (Fagan 2012: 121-51) . Though often seen as the one major triumph of Orthodox lobbying in the 1990s, Irina Papkova quite rightly points out that it was very much a product of particular context where Church objectives coincided with an anti-Western mood amongst much of the political elite that stemmed from the perceived failure of the outside world to provide the expected degree of financial support for Russian 'reforms' and the tendency of some Western political leaders to assume that the new Russia should simply buy into their political, economic and foreign policy agendas. In the religious sphere this was also evident in the mid-1990s in an often hysterical anti-sect campaign in the Russian media with religious and secular leaders attacking 'the invasion of the sects'. Here there was a tendency to depict virtually all 'unknown' religious minorities, from Hare Krishnas to most Protestants, as created by expensively funded US and European missionary groups, even though many of these groups had been present in Russia for decades if not centuries (Papkova 2011: 74-93; Anderson 2003: 115-38) . As the new century approached, interpretations of the 1997 law's out-workings varied considerably. It was probably true to say that whilst some groups experienced serious harassment and restriction, and continue to do so, the law did not take Russia back to its Soviet past. 4 In terms of democratisation, the importance of this law was the message it sent it the wider societydifference was not to be accepted or celebrated but rather to be seen as a threat. In later years there were to be various attempts to tighten the law further, restrict evangelism, and to ban some groups under 'anti-extremist' legislation which further served to 'securitise' religious others including many Muslim groups and some Protestants and others designated as 'sects' who threatened Russian security. For its part, the Kremlin appeared to be satisfied with the changes made in 1997 and unwilling to support further legal restrictions, though largely happy to ignore the persistent harassment of groups like the Jehovah's Witnesses, some
Pentecostal groups, unofficial Muslim communities and others lumped together as 'sects' or categorised as 'extremist' (Fagan 2012: 155-71 Church it is fairly clear that freedom of conscience was something that had to be qualified by the historically dominant Orthodox tradition, and that pluralism based upon equal freedom for all must inevitably be constrained.
Towards a new 'symphonia', 2000-2011?
When Vladimir Putin formally took over the presidency in early 2000 the scene was set for a change, as he promised to restore order and pride in a Russia that had been battered by the loss of empire, economic and social collapse, and political instability. Over the following years he evolved a system of what came to be described as 'managed', then 'sovereign' democracy which was sold as a model more suited to Russian cultural conditions, and which effectively came to mean that elections were held but that Kremlin backed parties or individuals dominated. People could vote, officially backed candidates could sometimes lose, but in a context where media freedom and public space was increasingly closed down, a degree of electoral fraud was common, and there were considerable organisational constrains on those seeking to create genuine opposition movements -leaving asides the failures of those who aspired to such a role. Formally this could be described as a 'hybrid' regime but one that leant increasingly in an authoritarian direction where the lack of genuine societal 'feedback' meant that the Kremlin was unprepared for the degree of public protest that emerged in 2011-12 (Petrov, Lipman and Hale 2014: 17-21) . For many this system of topdown stabilisation had to be better than the conditions of the previous decade, and this was The human rights approach has been…used to justify the outrage against and distortion of religious symbols and teachings. The same approach is used today to impose a certain course of introduction to various religions in schools, instead of teaching the basics of their own religion….In addition, there is a strong influence of extreme feministic views and homosexual attitudes to the formulation of rules, recommendations and programs in human rights advocacy, which are destructive for the institution of family and reproduction of population….
And he went on to attack relativistic approach to human rights, which should be implemented 'taking into account the cultural distinctive features of a particular people.' Perhaps inevitably, this led to a sub-committee of the UN Council issuing a critical minute, but the Russian Orthodox Church remained unapologetic (Blitt 2011: 406-10 ).
According to one church spokesperson, the original understanding of human rights lay in the Christian understanding of the nature of the human person who, while endowed with unalienable rights, operates within a moral consensus as in the case of the family where:
…the Christian understanding of marriage was adopted as obvious to everyone…. The church was also wary of going too far in supporting those in power when they made larger claims, as in mid-2011 when Kremlin spin doctor Vladislav Surkov stated his belief that 'Putin was given to Russia by God and destiny in a hard hour for our one big nation'.
Patriarchal spokesman Fr Vsevolod Chaplin responded that it was too soon to judge the achievements of the current authorities though he expressed the hope that Putin and Medvedev were sent for some purpose (Interfax religii, 12 & 19 July 2011) .
This relationship was to be tested further by public protests surrounding the elections of 2011-12. Whilst the church leadership initially remained quiet, a number of priests and theologians began to speak out, using both church publications and social media to indicate (Cesari 2014: 15) . Karrie Koesel in her study of religion and authoritarianism in Russia and China argues that 'the nature of the contemporary authoritarian project… provides incentives for collaboration' rather than the religion-state conflict often associated with political transitions (Koesel 2014: 28) .
The key contention of this article has been that in Russia building a recognisably democratic state, as opposed to a powerful state, has not been a key priority of those holding political power in the Kremlin. In these circumstances, the hierarchy of the Russian Orthodox
Church has proved unable and/or unwilling to promote democratisation. The roots of this reluctance lie partly in the absence of any historical experience of working within a democratic and pluralist context, on the part of a church whose senior leaders grew up and were often appointed in the Soviet era -though there is little evidence to suggest that younger bishops are any more inclined to pro-democratic attitudes. There is also a presumption of 1 Many states use a qualifier in referring to democracy, whether it be 'liberal', 'socialist', 'Islamic' or even 'basic' as in General Ayub Khan's Pakistan. The Russian model, however, differs from the latter because Ayub Khan appeared to accept that there was a core (Western) model and that Pakistan was not ready for this fullyfledged democratic system, whereas the Kremlin argues that 'sovereign democracy' is a fully democratic model appropriate to Russian conditions. 2 One could also argue that the Russian Church is closer in practice to an established church than the Church of England in the English part of the UK, because despite the separation of church and state in Russia and the Anglican church's formal symbolic and representational roles, the latter has less obvious policy influence than the Russian church leadership has had in the last 5 years. This in turn reminds us of the limits of formal models of church-state relations. 3 Russian Orthodox hierarchs like to speak of Russia as a mono-confessional country with religious minorities enjoying equal rights, but in reality Russia is a multi-confessional society with a dominant religious tradition. Though around 70% of the population identify as 'Orthodox' in surveys, religious observance and practice is at a very low level, and perhaps half of those worshipping on a weekly basis are to be found in non-Orthodox places of worship. Around 10% of the population are ethnically Muslim, mostly tied to particular regions though with large communities, often of migrant workers, in the Moscow and St Petersburg regions. There are also significant communities of Buddhists, Jews, Roman Catholics, various Protestant/charismatic groups -with some sources suggest that active members of the latter outnumber the Orthodox in Siberia and the Russian Far East -and a range of Western and indigenous religious groups generally labelled as 'sects' by the media and other religious groups. All of these will have some political interactions and some of them have representation on various administrative bodies, but the Russian Orthodox Church is clearly primus inter pares in terms of its access to political elites at the central level and in many of the regions. It is the only religious group whose leadership has engaged extensively with the issue of democracy, albeit in a largely negative way. 4 Ongoing reports on religious freedom issues in Russia are well documented in the news service Forum 18 which can be found at: http://www.forum18.org/; for more discussion on implementation and proposals for amending the law see Fagan, Believing in Russia, This document appeared at around the same time that the Kremlin pushed through a controversial law on NGOs. 
